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T HE GREEK historian Thucydides allegedly remarked
that "a collision at sea can ruin your entire day." Whether
his comment followed an unfortunate dunking, or was the re-
sult of a government-sponsored safety investigation, has not
been recorded.
The modern counterpart of Thucydides' remark may be
found on a poster or plaque at virtually any airport in the
country: "One mid-air collision can ruin your whole day."
Around airport lounges, jokes involving "aluminum showers"
are almost as frequent as tales of near-misses and close calls.
Behind the jocular tone though, pilots and air traffic control-
lers recognize that mid-air collisions represent the most
deadly breakdown of the air traffic system.
A mid-air collision' was the primary impetus behind the
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' The crash, given lurid coverage by the media, involved a Trans World Airlines
Constellation and a United Airlines DC-7. The two airplanes collided over the Grand
Canyon killing all persons aboard. There were no witnesses to describe the crash. The
facts of the crash and the subsequent investigation are presented in Ahmann v.
United Air Lines, 313 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1963).
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passage of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,' which created
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Yet the problem
of mid-air collisions continues, as more and faster aircraft
compete for room in the same airspace. One only has to look
at the history of the air carrier industry for the past 15 years
to see the tragic results of mid-air collisions: An Allegheny
Airlines DC-9 and a Cessna 172 at Fairland, Indiana; an Air
West DC-9 and a Marine Corps F-4 at Duarte, California; an
Air U.S. Jetstream and a Cessna 206 at Loveland, Colorado;
or the PSA 727 and Cessna 172 collision at San Diego, with
horrifying full color photos and agonizing cockpit voice re-
cordings that were brought into millions of homes by the
nightly news.
Obviously, mid-air collisions are not solely a problem of air
carriers. There is no segment of the aviation commu-
nity-commercial, military, or private-that has been un-
touched by the collision hazard.
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to articulate a
more exact definition of the term "mid-air collision," (mid-
air) so that the reader may gain a general familiarity with air-
space designations and flight operating rules. Broadly speak-
ing, a "mid-air" is any physical contact between two con-
trolled airborne objects. By definition, a mid-air does not
include collisions between aircraft and objects such as birds,
broadcast towers, power lines, or bridges. It also does not in-
clude cases in which one or more of the aircraft involved is on
the ground, such as the Pan Am/KLM Canary Islands disaster
or the North Central/Delta collision at Chicago-O'Hare. For
the purposes of this paper, a mid-air is any attempt by two or
more piloted aircraft to occupy the same airspace at the same
time-almost inevitably with calamitous results.
Pilots within the United States enjoy a remarkable freedom
of access to our nation's skies. Given sufficient aircraft capa-
bilities and weather conditions, virtually the entire atmo-
sphere above this nation is open to use. Considering only the
2 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958), as
amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1504 (1976), amended by, Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
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lower altitudes used by non-military aircraft, there are more
than 36,000,000 cubic miles to hold a comparatively miniscule
number of aircraft. All of this vast U.S. airspace is subject to
regulation by the Federal Aviation Administration.8 The re-
sult, created over a quarter of a century, is a scheme of "Fed-
eral Aviation Regulations" (FARs),4 which are of more than
slight complexity.
Perhaps nowhere is the system more complex than in the
definition of the airspace itself. Within a few miles (horizon-
tally or vertically) of a given point, there might be airspace
variously designated as a Control Zone," an Airport Traffic
Area,' a Terminal Control Area, a Continental Control Area,8
t Section 307(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 provides that the Administra-
tor of the FAA is:
[A]uthorized and directed to develop plans for and formulate policy
with respect to the use of the navigable airspace; and assign by rule,
regulation, or order the use of the navigable airspace under such
terms, conditions, and limitations as he may deem necessary in order
to insure the safety of aircraft and the efficient utilization of such air-
space. He may modify or revoke such assignment when required in the
public interest.
49 U.S.C. § 1348(a) (1976). Section 307(d) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. 8
1348(d) (1976), makes FAA rule-making procedures subject to the provisions of the
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-576 (1977).
14 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1261.407 (1981). As administrative rules, FARs have the force
and effect of law when duly adopted in accordance with the Administrative Proce-
dures Act.
s Control Zones begin at the surface, and extend upward to the Continental Con-
trol Area. The Control Zone has a horizontal radius of about 5 miles, surrounding an
airport with an operating air traffic control tower or a published instrument ap-
proach. 14 C.F.R. § 71.11 (1981).
An Airport Traffic Area extends from the surface up to 3000 feet AGL (AGL
stands for "above groud level") with a usual radius of 5 miles (concurrent with the
Control Zone) surrounding an airport with an operating air traffic control tower. No
aircraft may operate in an Airport Traffic Area unless it is in contact with the tower.
14 C.F.R. § 91.87(a), (b) (1981).
7 Terminal Control Areas (TCAs) have been established at the busiest commercial
terminal areas, such as Chicago, New York, Los Angeles, and Atlanta, and are far
more restrictive and geographically extensive than either Traffic Areas or Control
Zones. TCAs have the appearance of an upside-down wedding cake, with the small-
est-radius tier in contact with the surface over the major airport(s). Tiers with wider
diameters start at progressively higher altitudes, up to an upper limit usually between
7,000 and 10,000 feet AGL. In ideal (but not necessarily real-world) conditions, high-
performance aircraft enter the top tiers of the TCA and remain within its confines
until landing; slower traffic not bound for the primary airport(s) remain below the
"floors" of the various tiers, separating those aircraft from the traffic within. Without
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
a Controlled Airspace, an Uncontrolled Airspace,' a Restricted
Area, a Prohibited Area, a Warning Area, or an Air Defense
Identification Zone, all fitting together like a three-dimen-
sional jigsaw puzzle. The boundaries of the areas generally are
detectible only by use of navigation charts, aircraft instru-
ments, and electronic devices. Each of these areas is defined
with both horizontal and vertical limits, ranging in size from a
low altitude restricted area over a defense plant to the conti-
nental control area extending at higher altitudes over most of
the continental United States. Complicating the matter even
further, the areas may change regularly in the course of time
(such as control zones effective only during daylight hours) or
instantaneously by telegraphic "Notices to Airmen"
(NOTAM's) transmitted to FAA facilities.
Each of the various types of airspace has particular usage
rules. Some areas may be penetrated only by aircraft with ra-
dar transponders; others require radio contact with an FAA
facility and compliance with route and altitude clearances.
The Airman's Information Manual (an FAA publication con-
taining a wealth of material of interest to both pilots and law-
yers) describes each type of airspace and its general require-
ments and restrictions.
In addition to the problems of defining airspace, the Ad-
ministrator of the FAA is burdened with creating and ad-
ministering air traffic rules. 0 Regardless of the airspace and
specific approval, no fixed-wing aircraft may operate within the tiers of a "stage one"
TCA unless it is equipped with a radar transponder, a ground-interrogable altimeter,
and appropriate radio communication equipment. 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.24, 91.90 (1981).
8 The Continental Control Area ranges over most of the United States, extending
upwards from 14,500 feet above mean sea level (MSL). 14 C.F.R. § 71.9 (1981).
9 , 'Controlled airspace' means airspace designated as a continental control area,
control area, control zone, terminal control area, or transition area, within which
some or all aircraft may be subject to air traffic control." 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1981).
Controlled and uncontrolled airspace are perhaps confusingly named, and differ pri-
marily in usage during restricted visibility conditions. During fair weather, aircraft
may operate in most controlled airspace without ever contacting any FAA facility. If
visibility is less than three statute miles at lower altitudes, aircraft must follow "In-
strument Flight Rules" in Controlled Airspace and transit the area only in accor-
dance with an FAA clearance. The visibility restriction for uncontrolled airspace is
one mile. 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.105-.129 (1981).
10 Section 307(c) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 provides that the Administra-
tor is:
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aircraft involved, all flight operations generally are governed
by the flight rules of Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regula-
tions.1" Pilots have absolute authority to deviate from those
rules whenever safety requires, subject only to the duty to
provide a subsequent written explanation for the deviation
should the FAA so require one. 12 Air traffic control personnel
are subject to the rules found in various FAA publications,
which describe job functions in both general's and specific 4
terms.
Part 91 divides flight operations into two categories, with
significantly different rules and responsibilities for each.1 5
FAA personnel provide separation between aircraft operating
under "Instrument Flight Rules" (IFR). Instrument flight
may involve operations in cloud or in other conditions of re-
stricted visibility, but may also occur in clear weather. IFR
flights within controlled airspace must maintain radio contact
with Air Traffic Control facilities and report their positions
[Flurther authorized and directed to prescribe air traffic rules and reg-
ulations governing the flight of aircraft, for the navigation, protection,
and identification of aircraft, for the protection of persons and prop-
erty on the ground, and for the efficient utilization of the navigable
airspace, including rules as to safe altitudes of flight and rules for the
prevention of collision between aircraft, between aircraft and land or
water vehicles, and between aircraft and airborne objects.
49 U.S.C. § 1348(c) (1976).
- 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.1-.29 (1981).
12 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (1981).
" See, e.g., Air Traffic Control Manual 7110.65C (January, 1982) which sets forth
basic duties of air traffic control personnel with regard to aircraft separation, terminal
operations, emergencies, radar usage, flight routings, and other fundamental concepts
applicable on a nationwide basis. It should be noted that a number of courts have
found that controllers have duties of due care which may extend beyond the specific
functions and requirements set forth in this manual.
"4 See, e.g., Local Operating Letters (sometimes called Local Orders) which set
forth controller duties for specific facilities or special circumstances, and Letters of
Agreement between FAA facilities or between an FAA facility and airport or aircraft
operators. Typically, a Letter of Agreement will be implemented by one or more Lo-
cal Operating Letters which set forth specific controller duties regarding the subject
of the Agreement. For example, a Letter of Agreement between a part-time air traffic
control tower and the airport operator might specify that the operator will be respon-
sible for runway lighting when the tower is closed; an accompanying Local Operating
Letter might then direct tower personnel to advise the operator each time the tower
opens or closes and to transfer control of the lighting to the operator's remote switch
as necessary.
- 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.105-.109, 91.115-.129 (1981).
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along assigned routes.1' "Visual Flight Rules" (VFR) require
sufficient flight visibility and cloud clearance to navigate and
to "see and avoid" other air traffic. 17 Outside of airport traffic
areas and TCA's, VFR operations may occur without FAA
knowledge or intervention.'8 VFR flights make up the vast
majority of all flight operations in the nation.
During VFR flight, or during instrument operations when
flight visibility permits, it is the pilot-in-command who is pri-
marily responsible for traffic separation. 9 The "see and
avoid" rule of section 91.67(a)20 is applicable even if FAA per-
sonnel are simultaneously providing mandatory or discretion-
ary traffic control services to the aircraft. In general, each pi-
lot must maintain a safe distance from all other traffic.21 The
FARe also provide "rules of the road" governing cruising alti-
tudes, and giving right-of-way to less maneuverable categories
of converging aircraft, to an aircraft being overtaken by an-
other, or to the lower and nearer of two aircraft on final ap-
proach to landing.22
16 14 C.F.R. § 91.87(b) (1981).
17 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.67(a), 91.105-.109 (1981).
' Given appropriate weather conditions, a block of controlled airspace might con-
tain IFR air carrier flights, general aviation aircraft ranging from two-place trainers
to corporate jets operating either VFR or IFR, parachutists, gliders, and the Good-
year blimp. Air traffic personnel generally only have radio contact with the IFR
flights. Although controllers attempt to point out all traffic (identified or not) to IFR
flights operating in VFR conditions, and also to provide separation information on a
workload-permitting basis to VFR flights, the system is far from perfect.
Is 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(a) (1981). FAR 91.67(a) provides:
When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is
conducted under Instrument Flight Rules or Visual Flight Rules, vigi-
lance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to
see and avoid other aircraft in compliance with this section. When a
rule of this section gives another aircraft the right of way, he shall give
way to that aircraft and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it, un-
less well clear.
14 C.F.R. § 91.67(a) (1981).
IS Id.
FAR 91.65(a) provides that "No person may operate an aircraft so close to an-
other aircraft as to create a collision hazard." 14 C.F.R. § 91.65(a) (1981). More gener-
ally, FAR 91.9 provides that "No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or
reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another." 14 C.F.R. § 91.9
(1981).
" The right-of-way regulations of FAR 91.67 state:
(c) Converging.-When aircraft of the same category are converging at
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That aircraft still collide, despite the comprehensive regula-
tory scheme, might surprise everyone except our fellow attor-
neys who concentrate on automobile collisions; their practices
date back to the [fabled] day decades ago when the only two
cars then existing in New York City managed to collide. Air-
craft do collide-in bad weather and good, near airports and
over desolate territory, under every possible combination of
flight operating rules and aircraft types-and no doubt will
continue to do so as long as either men or machines have
frailties.
approximately the same altitude (except head-on, or nearly so) the air-
craft to the other's right has the right of way.
(1) A balloon has the right of way over any other category of
aircraft;
(2) A glider has the right of way over an airship, airplane, or ro-
torcraft; and
(3) An airship has the right of way over an airplane or rotorcraft.
However, an aircraft towing or refueling other aircraft has the
right of way over all other engine-driven aircraft.
(d) Approaching head-on.-When aircraft are approaching each other
head-on, or nearly so, each pilot of each aircraft shall alter course to
the right.
(e) Overtaking.-Each aircraft that is being overtaken has the right of
way and each pilot of an overtaking aircraft shall alter course to the
right to pass well clear.
(f) Landing.-Aircraft, while on final approach to land, or while land-
ing, have the right of way over other aircraft in flight or operating on
the surface. When two or more aircraft are approaching an airport for
the purpose of landing, the aircraft at the lower altitude has the right
of way, but it shall not take advantage of this rule to cut in front of
another which is on final approach to land, or to overtake that aircraft.
14 C.F.R. § 91.67(c)-(f) (1981).
To avoid head-on conflicts at cruise altitudes between 3,000 feet AGL and 18,000 feet
MSL, FAR 91.109 provides the "semi-circular rule":
Except while holding in a holding pattern of 2 minutes or less, or while
turning, each person operating an aircraft under VFR in level cruising
flight at an altitude of more than 3,000 feet above the surface shall
maintain the appropriate altitude prescribed below...
(a) When operating below 18,000 feet MSL and-
(1) On a magnetic course of zero degrees through 179 degrees, any
odd thousand foot MSL altitude +500 feet (such as 3,500, 5,500,
or 7,500); or
(2) On a magnetic course of 180 degrees through 359 degrees, any
even thousand foot MSL altitude +500 feet (such as 4,500, 6,500,
or 8,500).
14 C.F.R. § 91.109 (1981). Similar provisions are made for flights above 18,000 feet
MSL. Id.
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Just as there is no shortage of collisions, there is no
shortage of litigation arising out of mid-air collisions. Not sur-
prisingly, the courts have been far from unanimous in inter-
preting the FARs and defining the respective duties of pilots
and controllers. Initially, it should be noted that many signifi-
cant issues will be governed by state rather than federal law.
While it would be eminently reasonable to apply a uniform
rule of law to all mid-airs, the Supreme Court has rebuffed
attempts to create a federal common law applicable to avia-
tion disasters when the United States is not a party. 5 Even
when the United States is a party-defendant, the Federal Tort
Claims Act also requires application of the law of the jurisdic-
tion "where the act or omission occurred. 24 The liability ef-
fects of violations of Federal Aviation Regulations and con-
tributory (or comparative) negligence are governed solely by
state law. As a result, the choice of law may be partially or
wholly determinative of the issues presented in any particular
case.
The most straightforward type of mid-air cases are also
among the most frequent: collisions between two aircraft op-
erating VFR near an uncontrolled airport.2 ' In most instances,
liability will be based on a simple application of the FAR
right-of-way rules. "Simple," however, is a relative term; de-
velopment of the necessary evidence of right-of-way (or lack
thereof) may be complex, particularly when there are no sur-
viving witnesses. Even with witnesses available, it may still be
necessary to establish the relative positions of the aircraft at
and immediately prior to the collision by means of an accident
reconstruction expert.2
Once the aircraft positions have been established, it may
Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977).
4 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
" "Uncontrolled," in this context, merely means an airport without an operating
air traffic control tower. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.89 (1981). Less than five percent of the
10,000+ airfields in the United States have control towers.
26 Particularly during reduced visibility conditions, the human optical system is
notoriously deficient in depth perception. At least one court has found that even ex-
perienced air traffic controllers, with a vantage point superior to all others on an air-
port, would be visually unable to accurately determine distances to aircraft in the
vicinity. Thibodeaux v. United States, 14 Av. Cas. 17,653 (E.D. Tex. 1976).
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also be necessary for an expert to establish the respective
visual fields of the two pilots.2 7 The "see and avoid" right-of-
way rules are predicated only on weather conditions, and
make no explicit allowance for difficulties in spotting traffic
against a stationary background, or for inability to see traffic
hidden by part of the aircraft itself.2 8 The federal courts are
in conflict on the extent to which a pilot must maneuver in
order to search for traffic otherwise hidden by the aircraft's
structure.2 9 There is general agreement that when other traffic
is known to be in the immediate area (by sight or otherwise),
there is a greater requirement for vigilance on the part of the
pilot.3 0
From a litigation standpoint, perhaps the most difficult
cases involving mid-airs are those in which one or both air-
craft are in contact with an FAA facility. The situations in-
volve every possible mix of VFR and IFR traffic, with pilots
operating with positive separation control or with no FAA
control at all. The key issues, obviously, are the respective lia-
bilities of the pilots and the air traffic control personnel.
The applicable standard of care is concurrent, with both pi-
lots and controllers responsible for safe operations and traffic
separation." Controllers must not only be responsible for the
procedures within the applicable FAA manuals, but also to
some extent they must take additional steps to ensure safe
27 The right-of-way alone "cannot be considered a wholesale license to proceed
without careful surveillance" for opposing traffic. Allen v. United States, 370 F. Supp.
992 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
28 United States v. Miller, 303 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962) (interpreting earlier similar
CAB rules).
" Compare Bibler v. Young, 492 F.2d 1351 (6th Cir. 1974) with Rudelson v. United
States, 431 F. Supp. 1101 (C.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 602 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1979). The
cases, which involved mid-air collisions near controlled fields, arguably can be distin-
guished by the relative knowledge of the pilots involved that other traffic was in the
immediate area.
0 Hamilton v. United States, 497 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1974); Thibodeaux v. United
States, 14 Av. Cas. 17,653 (E.D. Tex. 1976); Allen v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 992
(E.D. Mo. 1973). Again, each of the cited cases involved mid-air collisions near con-
trolled fields.
31 Mattschei v. United States, 600 F.?d 205 (9th Cir. 1979); Hamilton v. United
States, 497 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1974); Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222 (9th
Cir. 1972).
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operations."' There is little doubt that when a controller is
aware of exceptional danger," he must act to warn the pilots.
The rule is particularly firm when the controller's own actions
have innocently or negligently contributed to the hazard, as
by directing aircraft onto collision courses.8 4 The additional
extent of a controller's duty to warn, if any, is one of the most
disputed areas in mid-air litigation. It has been held that air
traffic control personnel must warn pilots of any dangers rea-
sonably apparent or known only to the controller,8 or when
the controller is in a better position than a pilot to evaluate
the particular hazard.86 In several instances, it has been held
that controllers have a right to rely on pilots in VFR condi-
tions to monitor appropriate radio frequencies, to see and
avoid other announced traffic, 7 and to abide by all applicable
FARs.18 Nevertheless, several courts have found that the fail-
ure of a pilot to see and avoid other traffic in VFR conditions
is foreseeable and gives rise to a controller's duty to monitor
the progress of the aircraft and to warn the pilot of any
nearby collision hazard.3 9
" Thibodeaux v. United States, 14 Av. Cas. 17,653 (E.D. Tex. 1976); Harris v.
United States, 333 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
" Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1972); Hartz v. United States,
387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968).
" E.g., Allen v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
Thibodeaux v. United States, 14 Av. Cas. 17,653 (E.D. Tex. 1976).
" Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1972). Cf, Note, FAA Control-
ler Liability In Aviation Accidents-Duty to Warn, 8 U.S.F.L. REV. 452 (1973).
', Hamilton v. United States, 497 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1974); Thibodeaux v. United
States, 14 Av. Cas. 17,653 (E.D. Tex. 1976).
" Colorado Flying Academy, Inc. v. United States, 506 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Colo.
1981).
2 In Fikejs v. Lickteis, 13 Av. Cas. 17,657 (D.C. Kan. 1975), both a fixed-wing air-
craft and a helicopter were in the traffic pattern under VFR conditions, but were
communicating with air traffic personnel on different frequencies. The court held the
United States liable for failure to warn the fixed-wing pilot of the nearby helicopter.
Unlike the usual situation in which pilots become aware of traffic by overhearing ra-
dio communications between controllers and other pilots, the pilots in this instance
had no such indirect traffic advisories. Id. at 17,663. The Ninth Circuit found control-
ler liability in similar circumstances in Mattschei v. United States, 600 F.2d 205 (9th
Cir. 1979).
In Rudelson v. United States, 602 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1979), the decedent student
pilot and his instructor were in the airport traffic pattern at one of the nation's busi-
est general aviation airports. In affirming the District Court's findings, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found that teaching exercises were a foreseeable distraction during training
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Pilots operating while in contact with FAA facilities are
held to the same "see and avoid" standards as those in uncon-
trolled airspace, in accordance with the applicable FARs.40 Pi-
lots are required to give accurate position reports upon re-
quest,4" and to comply with all air traffic control directives.
A clearance is not, however, a guarantee of safety, and does
not relieve the pilot of his duty to see and avoid conflicting
traffic when weather conditions so permit.4 That duty is ar-
guably greater when traffic is known (whether by sight or by
overhearing communications between controllers and other
aircraft) or reasonably expected. 4 If more than one pilot has
access to the controls, either or both can be found liable for
failing to see and avoid other traffic'" regardless of which was
actually the pilot-in-command. When one of the two pilots is
less experienced, as on a training flight,"' the more exper-
ienced pilot may be held to a higher standard of care.'7
In IFR operations, pilots are not responsible for detecting
flights, and that the controllers were aware that the trainer was near the point in the
traffic pattern where collisions were most likely. The court held that "given the dan-
gerous realities of this situation, the traffic controllers owed the occupants of the
trainer, as well as the pilots of nearby aircraft, a duty to monitor the trainer's posi-
tion. . . [and] to transmit warnings by radio or light beam if the planes appeared to
be heading on a collision course." Id. at 1329.
40 14 C.F.R. § 91.67 (1981).
' Bibler v. Young, 492 F.2d 1351 (6th Cir. 1974); Thibodeaux v. United States, 14
Av. Cas. 17,653 (E.D. Tex. 1976).
4" Sawyer v. United States, 436 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1971).
"' Allen v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
" See supra notes 29-30.
'0 E.g., Schwab v. United States, 14 Av. Cas. 17,279 (W.D. Pa. 1976). In some in-
stances, however, it may be essential to determine which of the decedents was
manipulating the controls at the time of the collision. Medical experts may be able to
determine that question based on the physical damage to the decedents' hands.
4' An unusually large number of reported cases involve instrument flight training,
with one of the aircraft being used for simulated instrument approaches or similar
instructional maneuvers. If the student pilot is wearing a "hood" to block his vision
of the surrounding airspace (and thus simulate flight in clouds), he is not responsible
for collision avoidance. FAR 91.21 requires an appropriately-rated safety pilot to have
adequate vision forward and to each side, or have a competent observer in the air-
craft to supplement his search for traffic. 14 C.F.R. § 91.21 (1981). This responsibility
places a heavy burden on the instructor, who, in accordance with the FARs, is both
the pilot-in-command and observer, in addition to his role as an instructor.
', Rudelson v. United States, 602 F.2d 1326, 1330 (9th Cir. 1979).
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traffic that cannot be seen due to weather conditions.4 They
must, however, continue to use due care in complying with air
traffic control directives essential to traffic separation.e For-
tunately, today's radar environment and the efforts to sepa-
rate high-performance and low-performance traffic (such as
TCA's) make such instrument condition collisions far less
likely.
There are several other bases of potential liability relevant
to mid-air collisions, such as a negligent designation of air-
space ° or a manufacturer's failure to provide aircraft with im-
proved outside visibility.5 1 For the most part, these areas have
been explored only minimally in the reported cases.
The foregoing is presented only as a general commentary,
and should not in any event be taken as an exhaustive survey
of the issues or of the decisions in any particular jurisdiction.
Mid-airs, involving at least twice the number of persons, air-
craft, and other variables as all other air disasters, are poten-
tially the most difficult and least predictable of all aviation
litigation. Thorough investigation and preparation of expert
testimony is absolutely essential. In addition, a reading of the
cases presented in the footnotes will indicate the wide vari-
ance in interpretation given the Federal Aviation Regulations
by the courts. It is therefore imperative that the attorney
presenting his case before bench or jury have a clear under-
See supra note 19.
Sawyer v. United States, 436 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1971).
90 In Colorado Flying Academy v. United States, 506 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Colo. 1981),
the court held that the FAA negligently established and maintained the Denver TCA
without provision of a "buffer zone" between conflicting traffic on either side of the
TCA boundary, and that such negligence was a proximate cause of a mid-air collision.
The court further held, however, that the negligent acts and omissions were within
the "discretionary function" exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2680(a) (1976), and denied liability. Whether plaintiffs argued that the lack of a
buffer zone should have given rise to a special duty of care, as in Rudelson v. United
States, 431 F. Supp. 1101 (C.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 602 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1979), is not
reported.
0' See Bernard v. Cessna, 614 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1980). In Bernard the court af-
firmed a directed verdict for defendant when there was no evidence that a "window"
in the floor of decedent's aircraft would have prevented him from overtaking and
colliding with another aircraft.
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standing of the applicable regulations, as well as the facts of
his particular case.

